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The Value of Values and Assumptions to a
Practicing Lawyer
VIRGINIA A. SEITZt
INTRODUCTION

In 1992, Judge Harry T. Edwards of the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit published an article
entitled The Growing Disjiunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession. The thesis of the article was that
"law schools.

..

[had] abandoned their proper place, by em-

phasizing abstract theory at the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy"; and that, as a result, law school graduates were increasingly ill-equipped to practice law at the
highest levels of the profession.2 Practitioners, moreover,
viewed the legal academy as increasingly irrelevant to their
work. That article is still generating controversy and rebuttal; it spawned an American Bar Association task force and
several symposia and is a topic of law school retreats and
semi-empirical investigation today.
Relevant here, in his Article, Judge Edwards delineated
his vision of the "practical scholar." This is a scholar who
"gives due weight to cases, statutes and other authoritative
texts, but also employs theory to criticize doctrine, to resolve
problems that doctrine leaves open, and to propose changes
in the law or in systems of justice. Ideally, the 'practical
scholar' always integrates theory with doctrine."3 And, to
this ideal, he added another-that the practical scholar be a
teacher who provides students with "the basic doctrinal
skills: the capacity to analyze, interpret and apply cases,
statutes, and other legal texts," but also teaches them how
"to understand and apply theoretical frameworks and philot Virginia A. Seitz is a partner in the Appellate and Supreme Court practice of
Sidley Austin LLP. She wishes to express her affection for and gratitude to
Professors Atleson, Konefsky, and Schlegel for enabling her to think about the
practice of law.
1. 91 MIcH. L. REV. 34 (1992).
2. Id.

3. Id. at 35.
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sophical concepts so that they will have a capacity to think
beyond the mundane" in practicing law.' The scholar and
teacher Judge Edwards was describing is the author of Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law, Professor
James Atleson.
I hope that Professor Atleson will not be horrified by
this praise of his book's pragmatic value. Of course, Values
and Assumptions is an important piece of the rich normative scholarship of critical legal studies of labor law, a scholarship that includes Karl Klare's JudicialDeradicalization
of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941,' and Katherine Stone's The Post-War
Paradigmin American Labor Law.6 When I read Values and
Assumptions in manuscript during my first year of law
school in 1982, it was in this context. The book's thesis was
a revelation, albeit one that fit beautifully into the fabric of
a first-year curriculum that included Death of Contract7 and
The Transformation of American Law.8 At that time, however, I, like many students and some scholars,9 viewed Values and Assumptions solely as part of the critique of legal
doctrine made by outsiders and relevant only to outsiders,
defined as those seeking to change the law or expose as pretense the law's claim of principled coherence. In the twenty
years that have followed, I have practiced law as a labor
lawyer and an appellate generalist, and I have discovered
exactly how wrong I was.
In the specifics of its analysis of labor law issues, in its
examination of the common law origins of legal rules and
doctrine, and in its general methods of case-law examination and critique, Values and Assumptions has important
lessons for the practitioner. This Essay will provide concrete
4. Id. at 38-39.
5. Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the
Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978).
6. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor
Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981).
7. GRANT GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
8. MORTON J. HORwiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960
(1992).
9. See, e.g., Matthew W. Firkin, Reflections on Labor Law Scholarship and
Its Discontents: The Reveries of Monsieur Verog, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1101, 1124
(1992).
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and case-specific illustrations of the value of Value and Assumptions to the practicing lawyer in each of these respects.
These examples, I hope, will illustrate for students the fundamental importance of the book's critical analysis to excellent lawyering on behalf of clients, no matter which position
one advocates in a case. I apologize for the personal nature
of this exploration; but I can otherwise add little new to the
book reviews, praise, and critiques of Values and Assumptions already published in law reviews. The extensive commentary on the book and the numerous citations to it since
publication are a tribute to its importance. This Essay is,
however, simply a constructive thank-you note to James Atleson, Fred Konefsky, John Schlegel, and the other Buffalo
Law School professors who offer students the tools to think
creatively about legal problems.
I. VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW

A. The Practiceof Labor Law
After analyzing numerous Supreme Court cases, Professor Atleson concludes that the labor law doctrine announced
by these cases cannot be derived from either the text or the
history of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). One of
the central themes of Values and Assumptions is that labor
law doctrine can be rendered coherent if viewed as the
product of a set of underlying but unstated values and assumptions that judges employ in interpreting the NLRA
and, indeed, all federal labor legislation.'0 Stating the unstated, Professor Atleson posits: (1) that the judiciary's primary values in announcing labor law include ensuring the
continuity of production and management control of the
business enterprise, and (2) that judges assume that unless
controlled, employees will act irresponsibly and disloyally
because they have no interest in the enterprise beyond the
specific terms of their employment contracts."
Like any practicing lawyer, a labor lawyer briefing a labor law issue faces certain constraints. If the particular
question has actually been decided by the Supreme Courti.e., can economic strikers be permanently replaced?-the
10. See, e.g.,

JAMES

4-10 (1983).
11. Id. at 7-9.

LABOR LAW

B.

ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN
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lower courts and the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) are bound, and there is little one can do (other than
argue that the rule does not apply to your facts). But these
are not the cases that get litigated, as a general rule. Instead, clients present questions, and lawyers can identify
the general rule that governs, but it is unclear how the law
applies to that client's facts. Understanding the reality that
Professor Atleson lays out in his book substantially assists
the labor lawyer confronted with a difficult labor law issue.
To understand why this is true, a practicing lawyer
must operate on two assumptions that are generally, but
not always, correct-specifically, that the meaning of a statutory text can be determined within some reasonable range
of meaning by application of accepted legal interpretive
techniques, and that judges can and will both discover and
enforce that meaning even if they disagree with the policy
choices it represents. I recognize that many disagree with
these assumptions, but they have proven accurate often
enough in my twenty years of practice that I am dismayed
when they fail.
If a practitioner accepts that text and extant case law
has meaning that can reasonably be discerned, then the direct exposure of a value or assumption that might pollute or
taint the judge's reading of the text or case can prevent the
judge from unconsciously enforcing his or her own value and
cause that judge to attempt to reach and justify a decision
that conforms to aspirational norms of judging in our system. At the very least, it can press a court to address the
real basis for its conclusion and to deal with counterarguments directly, better presenting the issue for review. In
other instances, exposing the values and assumptions that
undergird a legal rule may enhance the argument that the
rule applies in a particular case because it produces the outcome that best comports with statutory purposes. In practicing labor law, Professor Atleson's analysis allows a lawyer
to understand when unrecognized values and assumptions
might torpedo or illuminate an argument, to identify those
considerations, and to explain why they should or should
not govern.
My examples principally involve the book's treatment of
"mandatory subjects of bargaining." The NLRA requires
employers and unions to bargain in good faith about "wages,
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hours, and other terms and conditions of employment....""
The Supreme Court has held that employers and unions are
only required to bargain about, and only permitted to engage in economic warfare over, "subjects of mandatory bargaining."' 3 Only those subjects that directly affect vital employee interests are mandatory; and certain subjects that
directly affect vital employee interests (such as plant closures) are not mandatory if bargaining about those topics
would not further the purposes of the NLRA. 4 Employees
and employers may bargain about other "permissive" subjects of bargaining, but may not engage in economic warfare
over them, even if the employer unilaterally modifies an
agreement reached about a permissive subject of bargaining. 5 To skim the surface of Professor Atleson's analysis,
the book argues that the Supreme Court's definition of the
scope of mandatory bargaining in its cases rests on inchoate
notions of "inherent managerial prerogatives," including the
necessity of management control for the success and efficiency of the business enterprise and the incompetence and
lack of employee interest with respect to management of the
enterprise. 6
I have been outside labor counsel to the Major League
Baseball Players Association for many years, and they have
asked me at various times whether the following subjects
are "mandatory subjects of bargaining": (1) the Major
League draft; (2) revenue sharing among the Clubs; (3) the
contraction of the Minnesota Twins; (4) the reserve system
and salary arbitration; and (5) the amendment of federal
law to eliminate the anti-trust exemption for Major League
Baseball, etc. In each instance, I returned to the relevant
chapter of Values and Assumptions for assistance in craft12. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d) (2000).
13. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 737, 743 (1962).
14. See First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 679 (1981); Allied
Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am. Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S.
157, 178-80, 188 (1971); Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co.,
380 U.S. 263 (1965); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203
(1964).
15. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 188. Although no economic
warfare is permitted over unilateral changes in permissive subjects of
bargaining, the affected employees may sue to enforce any contract rights. Id. at
181 n.20.
16. See ATLESON, supranote 10, at 143-59.
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ing arguments that these subjects are mandatory.
The arguments concerning the contraction of the Minnesota Twins are illustrative. The Supreme Court had already decided that plant closures and partial closures are
not mandatory subjects of bargaining when based on economic decisions, and the Clubs relied on the analogy between closing or partially closing a plant and eliminating a
single Club, the Twins. The Clubs stressed that the Court's
jurisprudence was focused on giving employers control of
decisions that alter the scope and direction of the business
enterprise. Clearly, the Association could not conduct the
argument purely in terms of the language of the Court's
plant-closing decisions. Instead, the Association made two
types of legal arguments that sought to shift the focus from
management's right to control the enterprise to acknowledged terms and conditions of employment.
First, the Association demonstrated that contraction
was not a management decision focused on efficient business operations, but was instead a collective bargaining
strategy, intended to obtain a labor deal with salary restraints and to force the Association to allow more revenue
sharing among Clubs so that small market Clubs could
compete. The argument was that because the Clubs made
the contraction decision to address labor costs and other labor-related issues, it was a mandatory subject.
Second, the Association pointed out that the Supreme
Court had indicated that the analysis of whether certain
subjects are mandatory might turn on the unique characteristics and history of an industry. In Major League Baseball,
the scope of the bargaining obligation is broader than in
traditional sectors of the economy because a wider range of
issues directly relate to labor costs. Critically, the Association argued that:
In this industry, players constitute a major portion of the Clubs'
capital, and the Clubs' product is exhibitions among its employees.
Players' interests and legitimate labor interests thus overlap with
issues of capital and product frequently. That is why the draft,
revenue sharing, and product design issues are mandatory subjects
in baseball, though the analogous subjects may be permissive in
17. See Brief of the Major League Baseball Players Association at 51-71, In re
Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Thirty Major League Clubs, Grievance
No. 2001-22 (2002) (Das, Arb.) (on file with arbitrator).
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other industries .... [N]egotiation about proposed solutions to payroll disparity, competitive imbalance and revenue sharing issues is
the very definition of negotiation in this industry. Contraction is
just one more such issue.

In this connection, the Association elaborated that although decisions about product design are not usually mandatory subjects, they are mandatory subjects where, as in
baseball, the "employees' performance is the marketed
product." 9 Moreover, the Association argued, removing this
subject from the bargaining mix would be destructive to the
goal of labor peace embodied in the NLRA because it was so
intimately related to the fundamental and concededly mandatory issues of salary at the heart of the dispute between
these bargaining parties.
Finally, the Association argued that baseball's exemption from the antitrust laws and protection from competition eliminated the justification for giving this employer
broad discretion to make business decisions unilaterally.
The Association pointed out that the two bases for shielding
an employer's capital investment and withdrawal decisions
from bargaining are "the rights that attach to owners of private property; and []the efficiency benefits achieved by the
market's unfettered determination of where capital should
be invested."2 But, the Union argued, these benefits do not
apply to Major League Baseball, which makes its franchise
location decisions without competitive constraints. "Accordingly, there can be no substantial claim of economic efficiency in protecting the rights of owners of capital freely to
withdraw and invest that capital."'"
Because this grievance was settled-as you know by the
fact that the Twins remain in Minnesota-it is uncertain
whether the Arbitrator would have accepted the Association's attempt to demonstrate that contraction is a mandatory subject of bargaining. What is critical for purposes of
this paper, however, is the nature of the arguments required to make the attempt. The Association's arguments
understand the fundamental concern underlying the Su18. See id. at 4-5.
19. See Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional
Sports, 1989 DUKE L.J. 339, 411.
20. Brief of the Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, supra note 17, at 70.
21. Id. at 71.
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preme Court's plant-closing and mandatory-subject jurisprudence and directly respond to that concern in several
ways. First, they seek to distinguish contraction from an
economic decision and to tie it to concededly mandatory subjects. Second, they seek to distinguish baseball from other
industries in terms that identify the players' interests with
capital and show that the Clubs' "retained freedom to manage its affairs unrelated to employment" is correspondingly
limited.22 Finally, they tie the history of bargaining in the
industry to the interests that undergird contraction. These
arguments acknowledge and attempt to deal directly with
the values and assumptions inherent in delineating mandatory subjects of bargaining.
A second example may be found in the Association's arguments that revenue sharing among the Clubs is a mandatory subject of bargaining with the Union. The Clubs have
argued that this subject is solely a matter of capital movement within the business and within their sole discretion,
and therefore that they could unilaterally alter revenue
sharing arrangements without bargaining. That argument
arose both in connection with contraction and in the protracted, stormy negotiations for the 1997 Basic Agreement.
In responding to this argument, the Association has demonstrated both that revenue sharing is intended to and does in
fact address salaries and payroll disparity, and that it is
inextricably intertwined with bargaining about those plainly mandatory subjects. Specifically, the Association has argued, revenue sharing regulates player salaries by providing low-revenue Clubs with money to use for salaries and by
reducing the income of high-revenue Clubs to moderate
their salary spending. In addition, the Association contends,
high income Clubs set the market price of free agents; when
they have more money, the market is generally higher to
the benefit of all players; increased revenue sharing drops
the market price of all players. Finally, the Association has
pointed out the consequences of the absence of competition
in the industry-that there are no competition-based benefits to allowing Major League Baseball to make the revenue
sharing decision unconstrained.
Like the argument that contraction is a mandatory subject, the Association's arguments on revenue sharing proceed from the premise that the governing jurisprudence is
22. First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 677 (1981).
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based on a set of values and assumptions that must be addressed and distinguished in order for the client to prevail.
One last example: I was part of the team that
represented the Association in its litigation following the
1994 season-ending strike. At the heart of that case, too,
was a question of mandatory bargaining-whether Baseball's reserve, free-agency, and salary arbitration systems
constituted mandatory subjects of bargaining.
After the 1994 strike ended the 1994 season, the parties
continued negotiating through the winter, but spring training approached with no resolution in sight. Although the
salary cap and revenue sharing divided the parties, they
clearly had not reached an impasse in bargaining. In December 1994 the Clubs nonetheless unilaterally implemented a salary cap and revenue sharing proposal, and we
filed an unfair labor practice charge, asserting that the
Clubs had unilaterally altered terms and conditions of employment without bargaining to impasse and seeking restoration of the contract terms for off-season free agent negotiations and salary arbitration.
After briefing before the NLRB and meetings suggesting that the Clubs would be found to have unilaterally altered terms and conditions of employment before bargaining
to impasse, on February 3, 1995, the Clubs rescinded their
unilateral implementation of the cap and revenue sharing
proposal. That decision, however, was simply laying the
groundwork for the Clubs' move to a different tactic.
On February 6, 1995, the Clubs announced that until a
new collective bargaining agreement was ratified, individual Clubs lacked authority to negotiate with individual players because the Player Relations Committee-the Clubs'
bargaining representative-was now the exclusive bargaining representative. This eliminated free agency and salary
arbitration, and also violated a provision of the collective
bargaining agreement known as the anti-collusion clause,
which forbid the Clubs to act in concert with each other in
negotiating salaries with free agents. There was no dispute
that these changes had not previously been the subject of
bargaining, let alone any impasse in bargaining; nor was
there any dispute that they violated the collective bargaining agreement. Thus, if the reserve system, free agency,
salary arbitration, and anti-collusion were mandatory subjects of bargaining, the Clubs had again committed an unfair labor practice.
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In hindsight, it appears that the Clubs had decided that
they might not be able to persuade the NLRB that their salary cap and revenue sharing proposal was a permissive subject of bargaining or that the parties had been at impasse.
As noted, the date for spring training and thus the beginning of the 1995 season was approaching. If the Clubs had
committed an unfair labor practice, the Association's strike
had become an unfair labor practice strike. In turn, that
would mean that as soon as the season commenced the
players would start accruing the right to damages in the
form of lost compensation if they offered to come back to
work under the old contract and the Clubs refused to allow
them to do so.
Thus, the Clubs decided to attempt unilateral implementation of a proposal that they believed they could better
defend as a permissive subject of bargaining. Specifically,
the Clubs argued first "that the right to bid competitively or
collectively [for players] must be a permissive topic of bargaining, because if it were a mandatory topic, the Owners
would be forced to give up their statutory right to bargain
collectively."23 Second, they argued that the reserve system,
free agency, and salary arbitration are permissive subjects
because they are a mechanism for determining rights under
future contracts, not a mechanism for resolving rights under
an extant contract.24
The district court rejected these arguments, and entered
an injunction requiring the Clubs to restore the collective
bargaining agreement, to accept the Union's offer to return
to work under that agreement, and to return to the bargaining table and negotiate in good faith about mandatory subjects of bargaining. In my view, the Clubs' clever arguments
about the importance of collective bargaining failed in large
part because, as the Association pointed out, they ran afoul
of many of the basic values and assumptions embedded in
the NLRA. Paramount among these is employees' undoubted interest in their own welfare; arguments often
make clear that a particular subject of bargaining is directly
connected to economic self-interest, which taps directly into
most judges' assumptions about the core purpose of the
NLRA.
23. Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc., 880
F. Supp. 246, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 67 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1995).
24. See id. at 258.
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Thus, the Association's brief laid out in detail the history of the reserve system, the players' battle for free agency,
and the pattern of collective bargaining between the parties-a struggle about the extent of Clubs' reserve rights of
property in particular players and the extent and timing of
individual players' freedom to change Clubs or increase
their salary by appeal to an independent decision-maker
(salary arbitration). The briefing sought to demonstrate the
deep, central connection between these subjects and salary.
In the end, the district judge observed that "the essence of
collective bargaining in professional sports is the establishment and maintenance of reserve and free agency systems
in which owners agree to bid competitively for some players
and collectively for others."25 She thus held that these systems are mandatory subjects because they determine salary.
Equally significant, the court rejected the Clubs'
attempt to harken back to the unionizing cry of employees when
they banded together to create this nation's labor laws. What the
Owners have missed here ... is that the statutory right to join collective bargaining units belongs to employees, not to employers.

The NLRA gives only employees the section 7 right to bargain collectively through an elected representative.26

In other words, the Clubs' attempt to conjure a notion of collective right and interest out of the NLRA was simply foreign to the court; the Act did not set up a structure for class
warfare within industries. As the Union argued and the
court summed up, "[t]he Owners' attempt to create reciprocal statutory rights to collective bargaining between Unions and Employer
is simply a wrong presumption
• - groups
27
from which to start.
On appeal, the Second Circuit was direct about the connection between the reserve system and free agency to salaries. It noted that under the reserve system "the right to a
player's services becomes the property of a particular club
with limited freedom for the player to seek employment
with another club. '2' This "maximiz[es] the transfer of reve25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 256.
Id.
Id. at 257 (emphasis added).
Silverman v. Major League Baseball Players Relations Comm., Inc., 67
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nues from players to clubs .
."'In contrast, the court
noted, free agency would "maximiz[e] the transfer of revenues to players .
"...30
Picking up a central Association argument, the court concluded:
*.".

Most importantly, however, both the leagues and the players unions view free agency and reserve issues as questions of what share
of revenues go to the clubs or to the players. The more restrictive
the reserve system is, the greater the clubs' share. The greater the
role of free agency, the greater the players' share.
To hold that there is no reasonable cause for the NLRB to conclude that free agency and reserve issues are mandatory subjects
of bargaining would be virtually to ignore the history and 3economic
1
imperatives of collective bargaining in professional sports.

I could provide similar examples as mundane as the
rules governing uniform and equipment or as significant as
the draft, but the moral of the story is the same in each instance. As Professor Atleson posits and my own experience
bears out, the key in any argument seeking to persuade a
court that a subject is mandatory is placement of that subject in the court's comfort zone of issues subject to collective
bargaining-that is, to persuade the court that your interpretation of the Act is in harmony with the set of values and
assumptions that undergird judicial interpretation of the
Act since its inception. In doing so, an historic pattern of
bargaining about an issue in conjunction with a demonstration of the necessary determinative effect of the subject on
salary or working conditions is central. The more attenuated the link, the less likely one is to prevail. This is particularly true when the employer's argument is that the issue implicates managerial control over its property or the
workplace itself. Similarly, the key to any argument that a
subject is permissive is demonstrating that collective bargaining about that subject will impinge on property interests or managerial prerogatives without sufficient effect on
the core topics for bargaining. The most effective labor lawyers address applicable precedent with a direct focus on
these underlying values and assumptions as they illuminate
the relevant case law and their implications for a particular
F.3d 1054, 1061 (2d Cir. 1995).

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. (emphasis added).
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decision.
Finally, and notably, the direct, unfiltered value of Values and Assumptions goes beyond its applicability to NLRA
cases to the general area of law (here, labor law, including
the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act), and
even further (federal laws governing the employment relationship). For example, the question whether an employee is
a supervisor or managerial employee and thus not entitled
to the protection of the NLRA shows up repeatedly in cases
under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
and any number of federal employment discrimination statutes. The insights of Values and Assumptions are equally
valuable in these latter settings, as is revealed by the Supreme Court's values-based, common law analysis of who is
and who is not an employee under Title VII in the recent
decision of Clackemas GastroenterologyAssociates v. Wells.32
B. The General Value of Arguments by Exposure of
Assumptions
As Values and Assumptions illustrates, labor law is full
of examples of outcomes dictated by assumptions about the
prerogatives of management, the status of workers, and the
imperatives of the economy. In my experience, there is significant persuasive force in arguments based on the exposure and examination of embedded values and assumptions
not only in labor law cases, but also in many other substantive areas of law.
Indian law cases provide a rich set of examples, because
judges make significant assumptions about the role of tribes
in our federal system. For example, in United States v. Lara,33 the attorneys representing the tribes were fearful that
the Supreme Court would assume that tribal courts would
discriminate and otherwise be unfair to non-members. The
tribal attorneys and other Native American groups formulated an amicus strategy that had as one significant goal
the exposing and discrediting of this assumption. Thus, several amicus briefs described tribal justice systems and their
fair and protective procedures, and detailed statistics concerning tribal treatment of non-members. The Court ultimately upheld the tribal court's jurisdiction over an Indian
32. See 538 U.S. 440 (2003).
33. See 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
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who was not a tribal member.
A similar concern animated tribal counsel in Plains
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co. 34-a case
involving tribal courts' civil jurisdiction over a Bank's sale
of land within a reservation but owned by a non-Indian.
Again, the tribes and their amici sought to demonstrate to
the Court empirically that tribal courts do not favor Indians
in civil cases and that tribal courts have rigorously fair procedures compliant with the federal Constitution. The outcome, however, was different, with the Court holding that
tribal courts presumptively lack jurisdiction over nonIndians, even in cases involving land within the boundaries
of Indian country.
It is very hard to draw conclusions about the efficacy of
exposure of assumptions in Indian law cases. Notably, the
question in Lara involved tribal jurisdiction over an Indian
who was not a tribal member, while Plains Commerce Bank
involved non-Indians. One might speculate that the burden
of demonstrating the absence of discrimination was higher
in the latter case than in the former. Directly confronting
and disproving assumptions about tribal law and practices,
however, appears to be one of the few weapons available to
those seeking to preserve what is left of tribal sovereignty
by persuading the Court that the tribes have voluntarily
bound themselves to provide non-members and non-Indians
in Indian country with protections equivalent to those provided by the federal Constitution.
A second example: In Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v.
Bollinger, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address
the constitutionality of the race-conscious admissions programs of the University of Michigan's undergraduate college
and its law school.35 The grant suggested to affirmativeaction proponents that any race-conscious admission at institutions of higher learning might be deemed unconstitutional. The University and its supporters were concerned
that its justification for the race-conscious admission programs-a strong interest in diverse student bodies-would
be viewed as pretextual, and that the Court would perceive
diversity as nothing more than a code word for racial prefe34. See 128 S. Ct. 2709, 2714 (2008).
35. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
206 (2003).
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rence, with no real benefits, instead of a compelling interest
sufficient to support race-conscious admission.
An amicus strategy evolved that was designed to demonstrate concretely the compelling nature of higher education's commitment to diversity. We filed on behalf of a group
of retired military officers, including Generals Schwarzkopf
and Shalikashvili, an amicus brief laying out the raceconscious admissions policies of the four service academies
and the ROTC programs at public universities, and the history of violence and racial conflict in the military that had
necessitated the growth of the minority officer corps from
one percent in the Vietnam era to almost twenty percent
today. It was in this historical context that the brief explained why a diverse officer corps was a military necessity.
At the same time, many corporations from the Fortune 100
explained why they would be unable to successfully compete
in the global economy without a diverse leadership, making
an educated, diverse workplace essential to economic security.
In upholding diversity as a compelling basis for some
race-conscious admissions policies, the Court expressly relied on these two briefs that had dispelled the notion that
diversity was nothing more than a disguise for racial preference:
These benefits are not theoretical but real, as major American
businesses have made clear that the skills needed to today's increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.
What is more, high-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of
the United States military assert that, "[b]ased on [their] decades
of experience," a "highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps...
is essential to the military's ability
3 to fulfill its principle (sic) mission to provide national security." 6

The Court went on to quote the briefs description of
race-conscious admissions policies at the service academies
and in ROTC universities, and to accept the briefs representations that (1) 'the military cannot achieve an officer
corps that is both highly qualified and racially diverse un36. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-31 (citing Brief for 3M et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents 5; Brief for General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents 3-4; Brief for Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents 5).
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less the service academies and the ROTC use limited raceconscious recruiting and admissions policies,"' and (2) that
"[t]o fulfill its mission, the military 'must be selective in
admissions for training and education for the officer corps,
and it must train and educate a highly qualified racially
diverse officer corps in a racially diverse setting."'3 Amici's
ability to undermine the assumption that diversity is nothing more than a cloak for racial preference by "proving" the
compelling national interest in diversity appears to have
been critical to the Court majority's willingness to allow
race-conscious collegiate and graduate level admissions.
My point is not that the practitioner will prevail if he or
she exposes the assumptions that might lead a court to
reach a particular result, and then demonstrates that the
assumptions are true or false. It is only that thorough advocacy does not stop with statutes and cases, but seeks to address the deepest, most fundamental bases that support and
cast doubt on the desired result. There is only one way for a
lawyer to persuade a court that holds particular values and
assumptions or that consciously or unconsciously believes
that the relevant legal principles are based on values and
assumptions hostile to the legal rule that lawyer supports.
The lawyer must bring those values and assumptions into
the sunlight and directly address them and the consequences of the legal rules at stake. And if the court's or the
legislature's embedded assumptions support the rule being
advocated, the lawyer's briefs and arguments will be more
effective if this is pointed out (albeit by tying it to the interpretation of statutes and cases, and not by a direct appeal to
policy). As Professor Atleson's course and book relentlessly
and repeatedly made clear, a good practitioner must habitually consider these questions in preparing legal arguments.
Values and Assumptions is a tool kit of analytical and
advocacy-enhancing techniques. It teaches the reader how
to dismantle labor law precedent by eviscerating the text of
decisions over and over again, and then persuasively locating the underlying values and assumptions. The same exercise can be performed in many other areas of law. And, of
course, in describing the tension between the text, limited
legislative history and purposes of the NLRA, and the
Court's decisions, the book also teaches the reader how to
37. Id. at 331 (quoting Brief for Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al., at 27, 29).
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argue that the decision-maker's values and assumptions
should not dictate the outcome of particular legal disputes.
The book implicitly suggests that the lawyer should expressly appeal to institutional values in judicial decisionmaking, such as fidelity to text, the relevance of legislative
history to interpretation of ambiguous text, and the importance of employing accepted tools of judicial decisionmaking rather than imposing judicial policy preferences.
Finally, the book demonstrates the strength of arguments
that have on their side the embedded values and assumptions for that particular area of law. Arguments that case
law reflects these values and assumptions, and therefore
that it is legitimate for judges to interpret and apply the law
to further such values and assumptions, can be extremely
powerful.
II. VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS AND THE USE OF COMMON
LAW RULES AND PRINCIPLES

A second major thesis of Values and Assumptions is
that decisions interpreting the NLRA can be explained or
rationalized when it is understood that judges and other
decision-makers (the NLRB) are applying the common law
rules governing master-servant relations and property
rights in interpreting the statutory text.38 Examples include
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,39 in which the
Court permits employers to permanently replace strikers
based on the common law view that employers have no obligation to rehire employees who cease work for any reason;
NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard)," in which
the Court upholds an employer's discharge of employees for
disparaging its product, stating "there is no more elemental
cause for discharge of an employee than disloyalty to his
employer"; and NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,41 in which
the Court essentially imposed the common law of trespass
on union organizers' rights of access to company property.
Professor Atleson's thesis is that the NLRA was intended to
supersede these common law principles, resulting in significant improvements in employees' rights; but that the Act's
38. See ATLESON, supranote 10, at 52-53.
39. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).

40. 346 U.S. 464, 472 (1953).
41. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
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goals were thwarted by the unconscious importation of
common law precepts.
Before I read Values and Assumption, I had not thought
generally or specifically about the interaction between
common law and statutes. The practicing lawyer can invoke
common law rules as backdrop principles in a variety of different settings and in numerous ways. There is virtually no
area of law and thus no case in which the lawyer's arguments cannot be improved by considering the common law
backdrop of the legal issue presented and the effect of that
backdrop on the governing Constitutional or statutory law.
My practice group provides the curriculum and instructors
for a Supreme Court practicum at Northwestern Law
School. In our sessions on research rules and techniques, we
teach, in addition to statutory interpretation, legislative
history, interpretation of relevant case law, and consideration of the practical and policy consequences of particular
legal rules, the necessity of examination of relevant common
law principles to assess their impact on the legal issue presented.
First, and most commonly, a lawyer can rely on harmonious common law rules to support his or her interpretation
of a statute. This technique is powerful and important in
bolstering interpretation of an ambiguous statute. Recently,
in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, the Court was required to interpret 35 U.S.C. § 283, which provided that federal district
courts 'may' issue [injunctions] 'in accordance with the
principles of equity."' Relying on dicta in several Supreme
Court decisions, the Federal Circuit and lower courts had
for years interpreted this statute to apply a near-automatic
rule that trial judges should permanently enjoin patent infringements once adjudicated. In eBay's petition for certiorari review of that rule, it argued that the text of the statute required courts to use the traditional four-factor common-law test for issuing an injunction. This argument was
supported by a detailed exploration of the common law rules
for issuance of injunction based on violations of personal
property rights. The Patent Act defined patents as personal
property, and the common law, commencing with Story's
Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, supported this interpretation of the statute. This authority counterbalanced
the lengthy pedigree of the automatic-injunction rule and
42. 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006)).

20091

A PRACTICING LAWYER

705

the effect of some unhelpful Supreme Court dicta in patent
cases. Ultimately, the Court adopted the common law rule
as the logical interpretation of the Patent Act, and indeed
went so far as to say that the general presumption, when a
statute authorizes injunctive relief, should be that the
common law rule applies.
Second, there are many instances where a federal statute represents an effort to displace or overrule a prior
common law rule. In these instances, it is useful to lay out
the common law clearly so that one can demonstrate Congress's intent to reject it, and the necessary conclusion that
the court must refuse to apply it. For example, in United
States v. Lara, discussed above, we argued on behalf of a
number of Indian tribes that Congress had enacted a statute specifically to overrule the federal common law rule
that tribes lacked jurisdiction to prosecute Indians who
were not tribal members for crimes committed in Indian
country.43 The brief contained a lengthy exposition of the
road to the common law rule, the disruption resulting from
its announcement, and the congressional action to solve the
problem. In addition, we described the nature of the common law of tribal sovereignty in Indian country in a variety
of analogous settings that the Court had already addressed,
and explained why this congressional enactment fit within
the scheme for law enforcement on reservations.
Third, common law can be used to flesh out the concrete
details of rights and obligations imposed by statutory provisions that lack specific content. We have recently employed
this argument on behalf of the Navajo Nation, arguing that
when the United States accepted trust obligations with respect to the leasing and exploitation of coal reserves on tribal lands, it incurred an obligation to ensure that the terms
of the Tribe's lease with a third party were fair and equitable to the Tribe before approving that lease. This argument
was made by providing a detailed exposition of the common
law of trusts and the duties it imposes on trustees of natural resources.
In a losing cause, we made a similar argument to the
Supreme Court in a case called Meyer v. Holley,' addressing
the question whether a corporate officer of a real estate
43. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
44. 537 U.S. 280 (2003).
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agency, who was also its sole licensed broker and supervisor, was vicariously liable for the discriminatory acts of the
agency's individual agents under the Fair Housing Act
(FHA). There was nothing in the language, history, or purpose of the FHA about the scope of vicarious liability under
the Act. We argued that the FHA, like all other federal civil
rights statutes, should be read to incorporate the federal
common law of agency which would, in turn, impose vicarious liability upon both entities and individuals. And then
we showed that the language ("any person"), history, and
purposes of the Act all pointed to vicarious liability for those
who supervised agents who discriminated. We directly argued that the imposition of vicarious liability on persons
who control or who are in a position to control the action of
those who engage in discriminatory housing practices was
necessary to fulfill Congress's purposes. Finally, we tried to
show that our theory was limited to the facts of the case,
and would not make corporate officers and shareholders
generally liable for the discriminatory acts of corporate
agents, because most officers and shareholders do not control and supervise those agents' work directly.
In the end, the Court held that corporate officers and
shareholders are not liable under a theory of vicarious liability. But, the Court adopted the common law test as the
relevant interpretive tool for filling out the meaning of the
statute. This was a victory for the client in its effort to make
other types of vicarious liability arguments under the FHA.
Perhaps more relevant to this audience, in cases involving the scope of a union's duty of fair representation to its
members, there have been serious battles over the proper
common law analogy to draw. Union lawyers have argued
that the decisions of unions are akin to the decisions of legislatures, and should receive the same deference that decisions of legislatures do when making decisions on behalf of
constituents. In contrast, individual employees' lawyers
have asserted that a union's duties to its members are analogous to the common law duties of a trustee to a beneficiary
or a lawyer to a client. In ALPA v. O'Neill, the Supreme
Court made clear that it was amenable to both of these arguments, depending upon the factual context, although it
ultimately arrived at the conclusion that unions should receive substantial deference in most settings.45 In duty of fair
45. See 499 U.S. 65 (1991).
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representation cases, these common law analogies are, accordingly, available to the advocate to shape in support of
his or her client, whatever side the lawyer supports.
Finally, sobering reminders of the power of common law
analogies appear in every Supreme Court term and on every
topic, in case any lawyer drifts into complacency. Most recently, we were on the team of lawyers representing Anup
Engquist in her attempt to assert that class-of-one equal
protection claims are available to state employees who have
been singled out for discriminatory discharge without any
rational basis.46 The Supreme Court's jurisprudence established class-of-one claims, holding that a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause exists if a single "plaintiff alleges
that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for
the difference in treatment."47 Both Oregon and the United
States argued that, although the Equal Protection Clause
has no exception for employment actions and although the
Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence extended to violations of the constitutional rights of state employees, the
Court should not allow class-of-one claims by state employees because doing so would eliminate at-will employment for state employees. The Court agreed. In other words,
a common law doctrine of at-will employment trumped the
plain meaning of the Equal Protection Clause as interpreted
by the Court in Olech. If any law student or practicing lawyer needs evidence of the power of common law assumptions, Engquist is the best, recent example I can provide.
CONCLUSION

One last meta-lesson of Values and Assumptions lies in
its demonstration of the value of analysis that goes beyond
the legal issue in a particular case and attempts to make
sense of a general area of law. Uniformly, I find that if I
speak with an expert in a particular substantive area, be it
admiralty, patent law, First Amendment law, or government contracts, there comes a moment when I say that I
cannot find a basis for an argument in the statute, regulation, or case law, and the expert tells me that "of course,"
this proposition is correct, and that it has long been a com46. See Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 128 S.Ct. 2146 (2008).
47. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam).
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mon assumption within the practice that the proposition is
correct. Professor Atleson notes that 'of course' statements
'
in labor law cases indicate where the corpses are buried."48
It seems to me that this is true for virtually all areas of law
involving substantive expertise. A generalist lawyer is most
likely to "screw up" when he or she makes arguments in a
specialized area based solely on a reading of sources directly
relevant to the legal issue presented without learning where
the corpses are buried. Had I fully plumbed the lessons of
Values and Assumptions more than twenty years ago when
I first read it, I would not have had to learn this lesson the
hard way.
In sum, in one way or another, and at every level of abstraction, the methods of analysis employed in Values and
Assumptions have affected and improved virtually every
legal analysis that has crossed my desk in the past twenty
years. These tools, for better or for worse, may be used by
lawyers to support or oppose any value or assumption. Unlike the book, the tools themselves are value-andassumption free. Use of the forms and methods of analysis
in this book allow a practitioner to better understand the
legal rules at issue and to bring deeper, more persuasive
arguments to bear in persuading judges.

48.

ATLESON,

supra note 10, at 24.

